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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Sean Anthony Thomas appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
 
The state charged Thomas with one count of lewd conduct for sexually 
abusing his daughter, who was between the ages of seven and nine at the time 
of the abuse.  (R., pp.6-7, 20-21.)  Thomas agreed to plead guilty as charged.  
(See R., pp.23-26.)  The state agreed to recommend that the district court retain 
jurisdiction if the psychosexual evaluator concluded that Thomas was a moderate 
(or less) risk to re-offend, and was amenable to community-based treatment.  
(See id.)    
At a June 2, 2014 sentencing hearing, the state gave a sentencing 
recommendation consistent with the plea agreement.  (R., p.41; 6/2/14 Tr., p.12, 
L.11 – p.13, L.1.)  The district court followed this recommendation and imposed a 
unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.52-54; 6/2/14 Tr., p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.4.)  The court then entered the 
judgment of conviction on June 12, 2014.  (R., pp.52-54.) 
In the next year, the district court did not place Thomas on probation or 
affirmatively relinquish jurisdiction.  Instead, on June 18, 2015, the district court 
entered an order acknowledging that the period of retained jurisdiction had 
automatically expired because more than 365 days had elapsed since it imposed 




received an APSI and recommendation from the Idaho Department of Correction 
to place Thomas on probation, but that it no longer had jurisdiction to act upon 
the recommendation.  (R., pp.58-59.)  On July 30, 2015, the district court granted 
Thomas’ motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in pursuing relief 
under I.C.R. 35.  (R., pp.64-67.) 
Several months later, on October 8, 2015, Thomas, through counsel, filed 
an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.  (R., pp.70-73.)  Thomas 
requested that, based upon Department of Correction’s recommendation and the 
information contained within the APSI, the district court either place him on 
probation or reduce the fixed term of his sentence to one year so that he would 
be immediately eligible for parole.  (Id.)  Thomas argued that his I.C.R. 35(b) 
motion was timely because it was filed within 120 days of the district court’s June 
18, 2015 order acknowledging that jurisdiction had been automatically 
relinquished.  (R., p.71.) 
After two hearings (11/16/15 Tr.; 12/21/15 Tr.), the district court denied the 
I.C.R. 35(b) motion on the ground that it was untimely.  (R., pp.98-103.)  
Specifically, the court concluded that its jurisdiction over Thomas was 
automatically relinquished on June 2, 2015, one year after the sentencing 
hearing, and not, as Thomas asserted, on June 18, 2015, when the court entered 
its order which merely acknowledged this prior relinquishing of jurisdiction.  (Id.)  
Therefore, the court concluded, Thomas’ I.C.R. 35(b) motion was untimely 




(Id.)  Thomas filed a notice of appeal that was timely from the district court’s 








 Thomas states the issue on appeal as: 
Did Mr. Thomas timely file his Rule 35 Motion because his 
period of retained jurisdiction began to run when the district court 
filed its order retaining jurisdiction?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Thomas failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 






































Thomas Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Concluding That His I.C.R. 35(b) Motion Was Untimely 
 
A. Introduction 
Thomas contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence and concluding that the motion 
was untimely.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-9.)  Specifically, Thomas contends that his 
I.C.R. 35(b) motion was timely because: (1) the period of retained jurisdiction did 
not automatically expire until June 12, 2015, one year after the district court 
entered its judgment of conviction; and (2) his I.C.R. 35(b) motion was filed within 
120 days of June 12, 2015, and was therefore timely pursuant to that rule.  (Id.)   
Thomas has failed to show that the district court erred.  The plain meaning 
of I.C.R. 35(b) and I.C. § 19-2601(4) provide that a period of retained jurisdiction 
expires 365 days after the sentence is pronounced by the district court, not 365 
days after a court’s subsequent filing of the judgment of conviction.  Therefore, in 
this case, the period of retained jurisdiction automatically expired on June 2, 
2015, one year after the district court pronounced sentence.  Thomas’ I.C.R. 
35(b) motion, filed 128 days later on October 8, 2015, was thus untimely.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 If a sentence is within statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence 
under I.C.R. 35(b) is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial of the 
motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 




The interpretation of court rules and statutes presents a question of law 
over which appellate courts exercise free review.  State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 
796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 
P.3d 998, 1001 (2010).  
 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Thomas’ I.C.R. 35(b) Motion 
Was Untimely 
 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent.  State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).  Because the 
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  The words of a 
statute “‘must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute 
must be construed as a whole.  If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does 
not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’”  Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 
265 P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 
721 (2003)).  “[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”  Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun 
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) provides that motions to correct or modify 




judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction.”  The 120-
day filing limit of I.CR. 35(b) is a jurisdictional restraint on the power of the court 
which deprives the court of the authority to entertain an untimely motion.  State v. 
Fox, 122 Idaho 550, 552, 835 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1992).  Within this 
timeframe, a defendant may file such a motion and attempt to “show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Huffman, 
144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840.        
Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) provides that a district court may choose to 
retain jurisdiction over a defendant after it pronounces sentence.  Specifically, 
I.C. § 19-2601 provides, in relevant part: 
 Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a 
plea of guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any 
crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or 




(4) Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the 
first three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the 
custody of the state board of correction.  The court shall retain 
jurisdiction over the prisoner for a period of up to the first three 
hundred sixty-five (365) days.  Except as provided for in section 19-
2601A, Idaho Code, during the period of retained jurisdiction, the 
state board of correction shall be responsible for determining the 
placement of the prisoner and such education, programming and 
treatment as it determines to be appropriate.  The prisoner will 
remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively 
placed on probation by the court. 
 
Thus, the relevant phrases to be interpreted in this case are “order 
releasing retained jurisdiction” in I.C.R. 35(b) and “sentence” in I.C. § 19-2601(4).  




to file his I.C.R. 35(b) motion within 120 days of the “order releasing retained 
jurisdiction.”  The retained jurisdiction in this case automatically expired at the 
conclusion of the first 365 days of Thomas’ sentence.  State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho 
30, 31, 121 P.3d 961, 962 (2005).  Thus, Thomas had 120 days from this 
releasing of retained jurisdiction to file his I.C.R. 35(b) motion.1    
The “plain, usual, and ordinary meaning” of the term “sentence” in 
I.C. § 19-2601(4) refers to the district court’s pronouncement of sentence at a 
sentencing hearing.  This is the event that identifies, and commences, a 
defendant’s sentence.   “[T]he only legally cognizable sentence in a criminal case 
is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.”  State v. 
Wallace, 116 Idaho 930, 932, 782 P.2d 53, 55 (Ct. App. 1989)) (internal 
quotation omitted); see also Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed. 2014 (defining 
“sentence” as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a 
criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer”).  In 
this case, Thomas’ “sentence” took effect upon the district court’s 
pronouncement of the sentence at the June 2, 2014 sentencing hearing.  At that 
time, and for the next 365 days, the district court and the Idaho Department of 
Correction exercised concurrent jurisdiction over Thomas.  (See 6/2/14 Tr., p.18, 
                                            
1 In the alternative, this Court could conclude that the plain language of I.C.R. 
35(b) permits a defendant to file an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for the reduction of 
sentence only within 120 days of either “the judgment imposing sentence,” or an 
actual “order releasing retaining jurisdiction.”  Under such an interpretation, a 
defendant would not be permitted to file, and a district court would have no 
jurisdiction to consider, an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence after a 
period of retained jurisdiction is relinquished automatically due to the expiration 
of the 365-day period, as opposed to via affirmative court order relinquishing 




L.25 – p.19, L.2 (the district court expressly stating, at the sentencing hearing, 
that it, “retains jurisdiction of this matter for a period of up to 365 days and 
place[s] [Thomas] in the custody of the Board of Corrections on a retained 
jurisdiction….”).    
State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808, 241 P.3d 981 (Ct. App. 2010) is 
instructive.  Peterson argued that the period of retained jurisdiction in his case 
did not commence until Peterson was physically placed in the custody of the 
State Board of Correction.  Id. at 813, 241 P.3d at 986.  The Idaho Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, concluding:  
We agree with the state’s contention that I.C. § 19–2601(4) 
allows a court to retain jurisdiction for the first 180 days2 of the 
defendant’s sentence, not for the first 180 days after the defendant 
is physically placed into the Board’s custody. A defendant’s 
sentence begins when it is imposed by the court.  I.C. § 20–209A. 
As such, the plain language of I.C. § 19–2601(4)3 contemplates 
that the time for the 180–day period of retained jurisdiction begins 
to run once the sentence is pronounced, regardless of whether the 
defendant is transported to the Board immediately or there is some 
delay. 
 
Id. (footnotes and emphasis added).   
 
Likewise, in this case, the first 365 days of Thomas’ “sentence,” which 
constituted the period of retained jurisdiction, commenced when the district court 
pronounced sentence and retained jurisdiction on June 2, 2014, and not, as 
Thomas contends, when the court later entered its judgment of conviction.  The 
                                            
2 At the time the district court sentenced Peterson, I.C. § 19–2601(4) provided 
that a district court could retain jurisdiction over a defendant for the first 180 days 
of a sentence.   I.C. § 19–2601(4) (2008).  
 
3 I.C. § 20-209A provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a person is sentenced to 
the custody of the board of correction, his term of confinement begins from the 




period of retained jurisdiction expired one year later, on June 2, 2015.  Thomas’ 
I.C.R. 35(b) motion, filed 128 days after that, on October 8, 2015, was untimely 
pursuant to that rule.  Thomas has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Thomas’ I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.   
 DATED this 13th day of October, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Mark W. Olson______ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
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